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Abstract  
This article discusses the features of “religious institutions” in the pre-modern Hanbali context. As we will see, the 
religious institutions were somewhat like the “imagined communities” that Benedict Anderson describes in his 
seminal work. Most religious movements and productions are not directly traceable to formally organized 
institutions and even when such institutions happened to exist, their function was usually unrelated to the religious 
work, or to religious intellectual activities as a whole, or in any case less relevant than the broader sphere of jurists. 
This sphere is discussed in the context of the clergy in the Sunni and Hanbali experience, where hierarchy and 
institutionalization were rarely operative. The article ends with the debate of whether ulama, namely the Hanbalis, 
represented a “corporate group.” Different studies adopt different approaches to determine whether ulama and 
jurists have established the type of solidarity that would qualify them as a corporate group. I argue that, although 
many jurists were members of such corporate groups, not all of them were. The general juristic sphere encompassed 
many who were members neither of a corporate group or even of a madhhab. This feature of free-floating jurisitc 
sphere allowed jurists to protect their domain from both internal and external controls. 
 
* Post-doctoral Fellow at Yale University, Law School, in Islamic Law and Civilization, and Senior Fellow at Georgetown 
University in the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. SJD and LL.M from University of Pittsburgh in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, B.S. from Qassim University, Saudi Arabia, in Islamic Law (Sharia). 
 An earlier version of this article was part of the SJD dissertation at the University of Pittsburgh. I am indebted to the valuable 
comments and feedback from Haider Hamoudi, George Taylor, Mohammed Bamyeh from the University of Pittsburgh, and to 
Amir Toft and Bradley Hayes from Yale University. I want to thank the Kamel Center at Yale Law School for providing me with 
the fellowship to continue this work and other projects, and I want to thank specifically Owen Fiss and Tony Kronman for their 
continuous support. I should also thank my brother, Eyad Alaoudah, for his assistance locating some important references for 
the arguments developed in this paper  
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I. Introduction  
This article discusses several features of “religious institutions” in the pre-modern Islamic context 
focusing on the Hanbali jurisprudential school (madhab) from the establishment of this madhab in 
around 850 by its founder, Ahmed Bin Hanbal, until around 1350. As will be seen, the religious 
institutions of the time were somewhat akin to the “imagined communities” that Benedict Anderson 
describes in his seminal work.1 They comprised imagined institutions because most religious 
movements and productions did not issue from formally organized institutions and even where such 
institutions did exist, their purpose was usually unrelated to religious work or religious intellectual 
activities broadly understood, or in any case were less relevant than the broader sphere of jurists. 
The “clergy” in the Sunni Muslim experience, to the extent it existed, was rarely hierarchical or 
formally institutionalized. The article therefore contributes to the debate over whether the ulama, 
namely Hanbalis, comprised a “corporate group.” Different studies have adopted different 
approaches to determine whether Islamic scholars (ulama) and Islamic jurists (fuqaha, sing. faqeeh) 
ever possessed an established sense of solidarity that would qualify them as a corporate group. 
One traditional orientalist debate focused on the question of whether the ulama had failed to 
institutionalize their religious authority and therefore were responsible for the lack of an organized 
corporate group. At the same time, others ask whether these jurists were ever able to really act in 
virtue of a common self-identity as ulama and thus constitute an institutionalized corporate group.2 
Both approaches were dominated by the orientalist presumption that institutionalization is 
synonymous with progress and leverage. They presume that the lack of dominant corporate groups 
and completely institutionalized ulama are failures. Through the example of Hanbalis, one of the four 
prevalent madhabs in Islamic jurisprudence (covering the madhab’s first five centuries), I argue that, 
although some corporate groups existed, the most important feature of jurists in general is the 
imagined sphere that delimits membership. There is no such organized institution that gathers the 
whole of the different Hanbali and non-Hanbali jurists, and scholars in one comprehensive group or 
rigidly classifies the jurists into corporate subgroups. But rather than seeing this as evidence of some 
failure by the Hanbali ulama to consolidate their group identity and mission, I understand it as 
evidence of the ulama’s intentional resistance to persistent efforts of institutionalization in order to 
maintain their sphere. Allowing them to be consolidated into a group may have offered unity but it 
would also make them susceptible to external controls as well as the internal threat that one 
particular interpretation of religious meaning would be adopted, pushing out all others.  
I will focus on the Hanbali “clergy,” some of whose juristic features persist and can arguably 
represent different jurists throughout Islamic history and probably even today. It is worth noting 
that not all practices of the Hanbalis could be generalized or were present everywhere throughout 
the Hanbali experience. Examining certain of these features, however, will enhance our 
understanding of the juristic work and draw attention to possible similarities with other schools and 
times. Most importantly, examining these features of Hanblai ulama in the past opens the way to a 
new understanding of other Islamic jurists, including some contemporary ones who are trained in 
 
1 ANDERSON BENEDICT, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, Verso 2006, at 1-9. See also 
TAYLOR GEORGE, Modern social imaginaries, Duke 2004, at 23-31. 
2 See e.g. MAKDISI GEORGE, Guilds of Law in Medieval Legal History: An Inquiry into the Origins of the Inns of Court, Clev. St. L. 
Rev. 34 (1985), at 10; EPHRAT DAPHNA, A Learned Society in a Period of Transition: The Sunni _ulama_ of Eleventh Century 
Baghdad, SUNY Press. 2000, at 143; KEDDIE NIKKI, Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East 
Since 1500, Univ of California Press. 1972, at 2. 
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classical jurisprudence. Taking different examples from different times and schools could reveal that 
Islamic jurists share more in common than we suspect. By presenting the formation of Islamic 
scholars, I will test the dispersed nature of these scholars and how they self-conceived their tasks and 
roles. Then, I will apply the non-corporate features to the political field to examine how their features 
affected their activism, withdrawal, and political mode in general. In the last section, I will give the 
example of modern ulama during the Tanzimat period to demonstrate that powerful features of the 
dispersed authority of the imagined religious institutions still exist.  
II. “Clergy” in Islam and the “Religious Institution” 
It is important to define what we mean by religious institutions and scholars (ulama). Our 
understanding of the term “religious institution” affects our appraisal of the roles, the nature, and 
our discernment of the decrease or increase in the presence and influence of that institution. 
Epistemological presuppositions regarding the characteristics of “religious institutions” have 
influenced the literature in a powerful, and in my view negative, way.3 Western writers have 
approached the issue of “religious institution” with presuppositions that reflect the historical 
experience of Western Christendom—its understanding of the religious sphere and operations—
rather than those of Muslim cultures.4  
At the same time, the phrase “religious institutions” as applied to Islamic history may prove 
misleading for two reasons. First, and most importantly, most of the work and literature produced 
by Islamic jurists and ulama did not take place in any formal “religious institution” as we understand 
the concept today. Many scholars who have enriched the judicial and religious literature with their 
contributions can hardly be linked to an actual, identifiable institution. Books, fatwas, and responses 
of Islamic scholars are religious works, but the religious community is not a religious institution nor 
is it mainly composed of religious institutions unless we use “religious institution” in an imagined, 
metaphorical sense.5 Even keeping this metaphorical and imagined institutional status in mind, the 
individual qualities of the scholar and his work almost always matter more than the aspects of self-
identity that are determined by their pertaining to a given imagined school, as we will see was the 
case in the ranks of Hanbali ulama across five centuries.   
The second pitfall of the term “religious institutions” from the point of view of the community 
described as such involves a large segment of the community that has reservations about the deep 
Christian heritage associated with the phrase. According to a number of influential contemporary 
Muslim scholars, the term “religious institution” possesses a connotation related to the Christian 
context in which it arose, a connotation that contaminates its understanding in the Islamic context.6  
 
3 For the idea of epistemological conflict between two cultural narratives and their powerful influence on our understanding and 
consciousness see MACINTYRE ALISDAIR, Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and The Philosophy of Science, The Monist 
1977, at 60. 
4 The researcher HUSSEIN AGRAMA noted the predicament of the presuppositions of Western studies that analyze the Islamic 
thought as a “problem” to be explained and then solved. This predicament happened because the Western standards and 
narrative were so powerful, and then shaped the presupposition about how religion operates in society. I may add here that the 
Western narrative shaped how we (and they) understand Islamic works by reducing them to “religious institutions” that 
dominated Christian literature and experience. See ALI AGRAMA HUSSEIN, Questioning secularism: Islam, sovereignty, and the 
rule of law in modern Egypt, University of Chicago Press 2012, at 1-42. 
5 This nature of Islamic jurisprudence is going to be discussed from another aspect, the (lack of) corporate group. 
6 See e.g. AL-QARADAWI YOUSEF, Al-Islam wa al-'Almanyyah Wajhan li Wajh, Maktabat Wahbah 1987, at 45; AL-HAWALI SAFAR, 
Al-'almanyyah, Dar al-Hijrah 1982, at 65-108; IMARAH MUHAMMAD, Al-Islam wa Al-Syasah, Al-Shorouk International 1992, at 28-
9-70. This book is important because it was first published by the Center of Research in al-Azhar, and is prefaced by then-al-
Azhar's Grand Sheikh: Jad al-Haqq who asserts in his preface that there is no sacred religious instiutions in Islam. 
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The vast majority of commentators, writers, and scholars in Islamic studies,7 especially Sunni ones, 
assert that there is no clergy in Islam, where “clergy” is to be understood as hierarchal and 
representative of the sacred.8 Although at different points in history there were clerical traditions or 
practices that were justified by different methods in Islamic jurisprudence and thought, these 
practices never formed a pattern or marked any divergence from the mainstream practice which was 
of a decidedly non-clerical nature.9 
The “religious community” whose Western counterpart would be described as a “religious 
institution” presents itself in the Muslim world as, for example, “scholars” (ulama) and jurists (fuqaha) 
more than “institutions” or establishments. For example, the self-presentation and self-image of the 
Hanbali scholarly community identifies them as scholars, jurists, authors, jurisconsults, and so on.10 
Therefore, the whole group of ulama as conceived by the ulama themselves is therefore somewhat 
comparable to the concept of “ummah” (Islamic nation) in the sense that it is not a physically 
identified distinct identity, institution, or group, separate and classified.11 Rather, the ulama as 
“imagined institution,” I would say, is a combination of organized institutions and religious scholars 
who may or may not be affiliated with formal or  even jurisprudential institutions known as 
“madhabs.”12 And even if most Hanbali scholars were affiliated to a fixed institution at some point, 
they acted as independent scholars whose authority derived from their scholastic aptitude more than 
from institutional affiliation. This is why, for example, they were much more invested in the 
imagined school of jurisprudence than the formally established schools of their times, as we will see 
in the next section.13  
Reducing the scope of religious authority to the role attributed to it in the scholarly literature on 
formal institutions leaves out rich historical debates and factors and, thus, makes the attempt to 
provide a normatively acceptable understanding of the clerics’ proper role unrealistic. This is not to 
say that formal institutions were not established or that they failed to affect Islamic jurisprudence. 
However, these formal Islamic “institutions” were inherently more fluid, dispersed, and horizontal 
to such an extent that they, for the most part, could not even be called institutions in the Western 
sense of the term. Hanbali jurists flow in and out of them, and their behavior tends to be that of 
individuals accountable only to themselves, often attached to a school of thought in an imagined 
sense that does not imply any sort of institutional loyalty or obligations to the school or institution. 
Portraying official religious establishments as monolithic representations of religious institutions in 
Islamic jurisprudence neglects a wide range of influential and sometimes more important segments 
 
7 See for e.g. AL-MAWDUDI ABU AL-'ALA, Naẓarayyat al-Islam al-Syasyyah, Dar al-Fikr. 1967, at 30; AL-QARADAWI, supra n. 6, at 36; 
al-HAWALI, supra n. 6, at 65-108; IMARAH, supra n. 6, at 28-9,50-123. See also BROWN CARL, Religion and State, The Muslim 
Approach to Politics. New York 2000, at 32. Brown clearly distinguishes between the Church-based system and clergy in 
Western experience on the one hand and Islamic State and governance on the other in the idea that Islam in its traditional 
approach does not  separate religion from state but meanwhile does not have the (Christian) clergy in its history. 
8 See BROWN, supra n. 7, at 32. 
9 HATINA MEIR, 'Ulama', Politics, and the Public Sphere: an Egyptian Perspective, Utah 2010, at 2; EPHRAT, supra n. 2, at 96. For the 
Christian clergy in the West, see e.g. JELEN TED, The political world of the clergy, Praeger 1993, at 23. Jelen here cited a clerk who 
specifies his job as to represent the sacred. 
10 In later examples of the other non-institutionalized Muslim scholarly communities see KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 149; EPHRAT, supra 
n. 2, at 10-14. 
11 See in general ANDERSON, supra n. 1; Taylor, EPHRAT, supra n. 2. 
12 See HATINA, , supra n. 9, at 2; EPHRAT, supra n. 2, at 96. 
13 MAKDISI differentiated between the schools of law “madhab” and colleges of law “madrasas/institution.” See, MAKDISI GEORGE, 
The Rise of Colleges. Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West, Eric 1981, at 1. It is noteworthy when Imarah in the book 
prefaced by the Sheikh of al-Azhar, and Abdul-razzaq al-Sanhouri, used the phrase “the Muslim nation with its scholars and civil 
institutions.” (Emphasis is mine). He distinguished between Muslim scholars and civil institutions instead of, say, “religious 
institutions” and “civil institutions.” IMARAH, supra n. 6, at 56. 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 5 (2017)     
Imagined Religious Institutions: Pre-modern Hanbali Ulama in the Juristic Sphere from (850-1350)|by Abdullah Alaoudh 
        5 
  
  
of the religious community. As a result, any attempt to determine whether the power or authority of 
religious institutions in Muslim countries at any historical point decreased or increased will depend 
on the how the term “religious institution” is understood and applied to the community in 
question.14 
Let us now take up the case of Hanbali fuqaha and ulama in order to discuss the idea of guilds and 
imagined institutions focusing on a very important period of the Hanbali school—the period running 
from its establishment (850) by Ibn Hanbal to around five centuries later (1350). 
1. The Ranks of Hanbalis (850-1350) 
Hanbalis refers to the fuqaha trained in the jurisprudential school of Ahmed bin Hanbal (d. 855), the 
founder and the main articulator of that madhab. The Hanbali madhab is one of the four principal 
Sunni schools that dominated the literature of Islamic jurisprudence. The Hanbali jurisprudence was 
established by Ibn Hanbal in around 850. It was propagated within learning circles by books of the 
founder and later those of his followers and adherents. Hanbali thought enjoyed a period of robust 
momentum during its early years which gradually dissipated until about two centuries later when it 
was revived by the Judge Abu Ya‘la (d. 1066), who is probably the second most important figure in 
the Hanbali traditions.15 
After the death of Abu Ya‘la, his son Abu al-Husain Mohammed (Ibn Abi Ya’la, d. 1131) decided to 
document the jurisprudential biographies of Hanbali figures, compiling and classifying them into 
ranks (tabqat). His book can be translated as “the Ranks of Hanbali Jurists.” Each rank represents a 
generation of scholars going back to the establishment of the Hanbali jurisprudence. Two centuries 
after the death of Abi Ya‘la, another well-known jurist, Ibn Rajab (d. 1393), resumed the 
jurisprudential biographical work, covering the ranks of Hanbalis from Abi Ya‘la’s time until his 
own. Ibn Rajab’s work can be translated as “the Supplement of the Ranks of Hanbali Jurists.” 
The two books, “the Ranks” by Ibn Abi Ya‘la and “the Supplement” by Ibn Rajab are both important 
works for understanding the jurisprudential works and institutions of the Hanbali madhab. They 
provide a survey of the Hanbalis from the establishment of the Hanbali jurisprudence (850) until five 
centuries later (1350). Each Hanbali jurist belongs to a rank that generally lasts between twenty to 
forty years.16 The authors start each biography with a simple introduction of the date of birth and 
 
14 As examples of analyses that suffer from this reductionist approach in a way or another, thus, concluded that scholars’ or 
religious institutions’ influence in the Muslim world decreased, see HAMILTON ALEXANDER ROSSKEEN GIBB/HAROLD BOWEN, 
Islamic Society and the West: Islamic society in the eighteenth century, Oxford University Press 1957, at 2:112-3. BERNARD LEWIS, 
Islam in history,Alcove Press. 1973, at 4; KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 149-167. Compare in general, ZEGHAL MALIKA, Religion and 
Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State (1952–94), 31 International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
371(1999); ZAMAN MUHAMMAD QASIM, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change: Custodians of Change, 
Princeton University Press (2010), at 1-17; HATINA, supra n. 9, at 9; SHADAAB H RAHEMTULLA, Reconceptualizing the 
Contemporary Ulama: Al-Azhar, Lay Islam, and the Egyptian State in the Late Twentieth Century, Simon Fraser University 
2007, at 1. 
15 IBN ABI YA'LA, Tabaqat al-Hanabilah, Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah 1996, at 1:73-133; ABU ZUHRAH MOHAMMAD, Ahmed Bin 
Hanbal, Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi, at 139-463; SCHACHT JOSEPH, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Clarendon 1964, at 63-6; WAEL B 
HALLAQ, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press 2009, at 31-8; MELCHERT CHRISTOPHER, Ahmad ibn 
Hanbal, Oneworld Publications 2012, at 59-82. There was an early debate whether Ibn Hanbal was a jurist at all. For example, 
IBN JAREER AL-TABARI in 922 A.C. argued that Ibn Hanbal was just an authentic narrator of the Prophet’s traditions, a position 
known as “muhaddith” instead of jurist, faqeeh. Ibn Jareer paid a harsh toll on this opinion. In 922 A.C., the followers of Ibn 
Hanbal in Baghdad attacked him, threw rocks at him until he died or probably was killed. BIN AL-WARDI OMAR, Tatimmat al-
Mukhtasar fi Akhbar al-Bashar (Tarikh Ibn al-Waerdi), Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah 1996, at 1-248-9. 
16 For the ranks (or layers, as FRANZ ROSENTHAL translated the word “Tabqat”), ROSENTHAL notes that dividing Muslim 
biographies into figures is an authentic Islamic approach to historiography. It started with the first generation of the Prophet’s 
companions (Peace Be Upon Him). According to him, some Muslim medieval historians choose twenty years for a rank, while 
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place and a list of teachers and instructors. Then, Ibn Abi Ya‘la and Ibn Rajab narrate the main events 
of the life of the jurist, and how they contributed to the Hanbali jurisprudence. Usually, the two 
authors end each biography with notable jurisprudential opinions and selections (ikhtiarat) by that 
jurist. Reading the texts, one notices figures who are more influential in the Hanbali jurisprudence 
than others—those individuals whose authority is considered sufficient to establish a new 
interpretation of the Hanbali jurisprudence to be followed by adherents of the school. Examples of 
these influential include al-Khallal (d. 923), al-Barbahari (d. 940), al-Khiraqi (d. 954), al-Harawi 
(1089), and Ibn Hubairah (d. 1165).17 
In the following sections, I will discuss the Hanbali mode—juristic features that persist and describe 
different judicial practices throughout Islamic history and probably even today. It would be 
inaccurate to generalize and project practices that existed at specific times and circumstances, yet a 
broad grasp of these features will enhance our understanding of the juristic work, and draw our 
attention to the possibility of similar features in other schools and times. Ideally, these features of the 
past Hanblai would lead us to a fuller understanding of other Islamic jurists, some even 
contemporary, whose outlook and orientation largely follows the structures of classical Islamic 
jurisprudence.   
2. The Ulama as Corporate Group 
If indeed neither “clergy” nor “religious institutions,” as they are understood in the West, existed in 
analogical form in the Islamic mainstream or at least did not have a central role in the religious life of 
the community could other corporate groups have existed and exerted influence? In this section, I 
will review some important ideas from the literature on this subject, and by taking the Hanbali 
example, I will conclude that some corporate groups or guilds did indeed exist in the Islamic context. 
The most important defining feature of such groups, however, is the existence of a sphere that 
encompasses both corporate and non-corporate groups. Other than the existence of the juristic 
sphere, there was no such organized institution that gathered the different jurists, scholars, and 
institutions into a single comprehensive corporate group or established a corporate relationship 
between all the bodies of religious scholars. For those reasons, I argue that corporate relationships 
were at most secondary in the religious juristic sphere. 
Following Louis Massignon valuation of the importance of “guilds” in Islamic history,18 George 
Makdisi went one step further by applying the concept not only to formal schools and associations of 
artisans in medieval Islam but also to jurisprudential schools (madhabs).19 Sherman Jackson, in turn, 
described the relationship of the jurist to the jurisprudential school (madhab) in terms of “corporate 
status” where “[e]ach school (madhab) acquires the ability to confer a measure of protection to its 
members by virtue of their membership in that particular group.”20 Jackson, interestingly, likened 
the relationship between the individual jurist and the corporate group, the madhab in this case, to the 
 
others extend it to forty years. However, a third group seems to fluctuate between the twenty and forty and stretch it sometimes 
more. The case of the two compilations here of the Ranks of Hanbalis and it Supplement seem to adopt the latter approach. See 
AL-IMAM MUSLIM AL-NAISABOURI, al-Tabaqat, Dar al-Hijrah 1st ed. 1991, at 33-8; ROSENTHAL, A History of Muslim 
Historiography, E. J. Brill. 1968, at 82-3. 
17 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 2:64, 16, 64; IBN RAJAB, Dhail Tabaqat al-Hanabilah, Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah 1996, at 1:44 -211-38. 
18 According to MAKDISI, Louis Massignon was the first who spoke of guilds in Islam in an article published in 1920. MAKDISI, 
supra n. 2, at 4. 
19 MAKDISI, supra n. 13, at 1. See IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 1:73-133; ABU ZUHRAH, supra n. 15, at 139-463; SCHACHT, supra n. 15, at 
63-6 (1964); HALLAQ, supra n. 15, at 31-8; MELCHERT, supra n. 15, at 59-82. 
20 SHERMAN JACKSON, Islamic Law and the State: the Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī, Brill 1996, at 72. 
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relationship between the rajih (weighted opinion) and the mashhur (predominant opinion) in Islamic 
jurisprudence. Both individual and weighted opinions could be substantively more valuable in term 
of jurisprudence, but the predominant opinion and corporate group usually exert more influence.21 
As Daphna Ephrat concludes in her study of the Sunni ulama of the eleventh-century Baghdad in A 
Learned Society in a Period of Transition, affiliation with a madhab, at some point, lost the sense of 
“solidarity group” and became a formal, hollower bond.22 Although group solidarity had been 
established, the ulama, as a whole, never demonstrated serious commitment to it.23 
To test whether the Hanbalis can be considered a corporate group, I will first see whether 
membership in the group proffered its members protection. Ibn Abi Ya‘la begins the series of Ranks 
of Hanbali by emphasizing a startling principle of Islam. He asserts that “the [doctrine] of loyalty 
and enmity is an innovation. Those who [think it is part of their faith to] say we are loyal to this 
person or a group and enemy to another [other than the general loyalty to Islam itself]” are religious 
innovators.24 In other words, by just considering loyalty to a certain group as an innovation, the very 
idea of “by-virtue-of-their-membership” is rejected because what matters, according to one 
prominent narrator of Hanbali biographies and jurisprudence, are the principles and general 
doctrines of the madhab, not affiliation with any school or group.  
On the other hand, in the Ranks, in telling the stories of Hanbalis, Ibn Abi Ya‘la divides them into 
ranks and treats them as a group of people who have some affiliation to Hanbali jurisprudence and 
institutionalized benefits. For example, Abu Muhammed al-Barbahari, from the second rank of 
Hanbalis, is the “leader of the Hanbali community in his time,” and was “leading in fighting against 
the people of [religious] innovation,” according to Ibn Abi Ya‘la.25 He says that al-Barbahari “has a 
reputation at the ruler’s court and a prominence among our [Hanbali] people” and that he “was one 
of the well-versed distinguished leading scholars who memorized hadiths, are trustworthy, and 
faithful.”26 Although al-Barbahari was a leader of the community, he acts mostly on the basis of 
principles against “people of religious innovation” whatever their affiliation. On the other hand, 
other Hanbali figures from different ranks, such as al-Khiraqi, Abduaziz Ghulam al-Zajjaj, and Abu 
Abdullah Ibn Hamid were also described as “leaders of the Hanbalis” of their times which brings the 
issue of affiliation again.27 
Also of note is the ease with which affiliation can be changed, like in the case of Abi Ya‘la, the father 
of the Ibn Abi Ya‘la and one of the leading Hanbalis of all time. Abi Ya‘la was introduced to the 
Hanbali jurisprudence by the above-mentioned Ibn Hamid. Abi Ya‘la’s religious and legal education, 
which had begun by age ten, had followed the Hanafi madhab until he met Ibn Hamid, who inspired 
him and opened his eyes to the Hanbali jurisprudence.28 The change reveals both the strong 
attraction of Hanbali jurisprudence and the competition among jurists to strengthen their 
jurisprudence and, at the same time, we can sense the relative strength of the individual 
relationships among jurists over institutional affiliations to the extent that jurists could change 
 
21 JACKSON, supra n. 19, at 83. MAKDISI also presented the argument that schools were based on individuals so they did not 
establish “guilds”.  MAKDISI, supra n. 2, at 10. 
22 EPHRAT, supra n. 2, at 143. 
23 EPHRAT, supra n. 2, at 96. 
24 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 1:37. 
25 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 2:16. 
26 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 2:16 
27 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 2:64-143-5. 
28 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at, 2:166-7. 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 5 (2017)     
Imagined Religious Institutions: Pre-modern Hanbali Ulama in the Juristic Sphere from (850-1350)|by Abdullah Alaoudh 
        8 
  
  
madhab affiliation following an encounter with a charismatic learned scholar, as in the case of Ibn 
Hamid.29 
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Hanbali school increasingly developed toward certain 
symbols and institutions. We start to notice a Hanbali “pulpit” from which one Hanbali once 
preached, “I am a Hanbali as much as I am alive, and when I die, my will for the people is to follow 
the Hanbali school.”30 Another Hanbali taught a friend to respond when asked by God what he 
followed by simply saying “Ibn Hanbal.”31 We also notice that in addition to Hanbali schools 
(madrasa), the Hanbali learning circle (halaqah), the Hanbali section, the Hanbali leader, and the 
Hanbali endowments,32 a Hanbali niche devoted to prayers involving the Hanbali jurisprudence is 
mentioned more than three times.33 Indeed there is even a Hanbali qadiship, about which Ibn Rajab 
complains because it is sometimes empty and no Hanbalis appear disposed to occupy it.34 
While madrasas can exclusively follow one jurisprudential school such as the Hanbali madhab, other 
madrasas existed that taught more than one jurisprudence.35 Al-Mustansir Billah, for instance, 
established a madrasa in the 1230s, and assigned two principal supervisors to it: Abu al-Waleed al-
Hanbali and Ibn al-Najjar al-Shafi‘i.36 In this madrasa, both jurisprudences were taught and both 
madhabs competed to gain followers among students and the learning community. In these madrasas, 
presenting the principles of jurisprudence mattered more than belonging to a particular madhab. The 
case of Muwaffaq al-Din Ibn Qudamah (d. 1223) is worth relating.  
Ibn Qudamah was the leader of that Hanbalis at the great mosque of Damascus. According to Ibn 
Rajab, towards the end of his life, “he was the destination of every jurist regardless of madhahb.”37 
Therefore, while Ibn Qudamah was the head of Hanbalis and one of the most influential Hanbalis of 
all times, he nonetheless taught jurists from other madhabs and his influence went beyond madhab 
affiliation or “membership.” Different well-known ulama recognized the high level of independent 
jurisprudential reasoning that Ibn Qudamah reached—a concept known as Ijtihad.38 This is relevant 
for the purposes of this article because reaching such a level of ijtihad is considered reaching a point 
that goes beyond representing a sole madhab or jurisprudence. Ibn Rajab tells us that Ibn Qudamah 
“used every Friday to run a learning circle and, then afterwards, engage in an hour debate with 
opponents and dissenting jurists.”39 Ibn Rajab mentions famous jurists from different backgrounds 
 
29 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 2:16-7. 
30 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 1:44. 
31 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 1:33. 
32 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 2: 139, 152,189,227-243. 
33 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 2:137,178-227. 
34 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 2: 178-189. 
35 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at, 2: 136. 
36 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 2:139. 
37 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at, 2: 63. 
38 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 2:63-6. For the classical discussions of ijtihad and its rulings and requirements, see the classical sources 
in the origins of jurisprudence e.g. AL-ZIRKESHI BADR AL-DEEN, al-Bahr al-Muheet, Dar al-Kutbi 1994, at 8:226-58; AL-GHAZALI 
ABU HAMID, al-Mustasfa, Islamic U of Medina 1995, at 4:10-129; AL-AAMIDI ALI BIN AHMED, al-Ihkam Fi Usul al-Ahkam, Al-
Maktab al-Islami, at 4:162-221; ALJAWZEYYAH IBN QAYYEM, I'lam al-Muqe'een, Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ailmayyah 1991, at 2:126-9; AL-
SHATIBI IBRAHEEM, al-Muwafaqat, Dar Ibn al-Qayyem-Dar Ibn Affan 2003, at 5:41-58; AL-TUFI NAJM AL-DEEN SULAIMAN, 
Mukhtasar Sharh al-Rawdhah, Mu'assasat al-Risalah 1987, at 3:575-84; AL-SHUKANI MUHAMMED ALI, Irshad al-Fuhul Ila 
Tahqeeq 'Ilm al-Usul, Dar al-Salam 1998, at 2:713-54; AL-SHINQEETI, Al-Mudhakkirah Fi Usul al-Fiqh, n.a. 2001, at 369-74. In the 
orientalist literature, JOSEPH SCHACHT discussed the concept of “closing the door of ijtihad” that was introduced to the Islamic 
jurisprudential centuries after the development of the four main schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘I, and Hanbali) in Islamic 
jurisprudence. SCHACHT, supra n. 15, at 69. Compare with Wael Hallaq’s critique of Schacht’s approach in discussing ijtihad and 
“closing the door of ijtihad”, HALLAQ WAEL, Was the gate of ijtihad closed?, 16 International Journal Of Middle East Studies 
(1984), at 2. 
39 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 2:63. 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 5 (2017)     
Imagined Religious Institutions: Pre-modern Hanbali Ulama in the Juristic Sphere from (850-1350)|by Abdullah Alaoudh 
        9 
  
  
and madhabs who would not issue Islamic responsa until having read Ibn Qudamah’s works. Lastly, 
Ibn Rajab lists some of Ibn Qudamah’s major opinions, as well as a selection of jurisprudential work 
by which Ibn Qudamah went beyond the school of Ibn Hanbal.40 
The case of Hanbalis, as presented by the accounts by Ibn Abi Ya‘la and Ibn Rajab that span five 
centuries, clearly demonstrates the existence of corporate elements but, at the same time, corporate 
self-identity was also clearly limited and never attained enough strength to seriously affect Islamic 
jurisprudence on the whole. Perhaps the bonds of affiliation were too loose, or maybe the jurists are 
to be blamed for failing to construe a community tied by solidarity. Or, on the other hand as I argue, 
perhaps a conscious decision was made to eschew an authoritative group identity to protect that 
community from domination or total political control. In the modern Western literature, debate 
continues to examine whether, from the fifteenth century onwards, ulama in general maintained a 
robust, continuous corporate nature.     
In the work Scholars, Saints, and Sufis, different academics discuss religious institutions in Islam from 
the fifteenth century on. One theme that runs throughout the book is the reading of ulama as a 
“corporate group.” Unlike Massignon, Makdisi, and Jackson, the researchers Nikki Keddie (editor),41 
Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot,42 Edmund Burke III,43 Daniel Crecelius,44 and Aziz Ahmed45 argue that 
the ulama do not consistently act as a “corporate group.” 46 Marsot complains that the (high) ulama in 
the eighteenth century did not act as a corporate group and did not perform specific state functions 
and, therefore, failed to achieve much influence.47 A counterexample is found in Leon Carl Brown’s 
account of nineteenth-century Tunisia, where the ulama are seen to have a sense of a “corporate 
entity separating themselves from the government,”48 but this example seems rather exceptional.49 
Much more common are assertions such as that of Edmund Burke III who notes that until 1900, 
“[n]ot only was there no religious institution, per se, in Morocco in the sense that there was no 
separate bureaucratic hierarchy of religious officials controlled from the top, it is even possible to say 
that ulama as an identifiable corporate group did not exist in Morocco.”50 Aziz Ahmed, describing the 
ulama of Pakistan, notes that in 1950s and 1960 their activity decreased dramatically because they 
were making individual efforts, not collective ones, to exert influence.51 An operative presupposition 
of these researchers is that the ulama should have behaved as a corporate group in order to capitalize 
on the group’s social status, so they are consequently criticized by the researchers for having lacked 
the quality of corporate solidarity. 
In fact, the lack of corporate identity and belonging in the ulama’s functions and roles in these cases 
and that of the Hanbalis might have more to do with the nature of their role as dispersed groups 
 
40 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 2:63. 
41 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 2. 
42 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 146-150. 
43 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 101-6. 
44 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 180-1. 
45 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 264.  
46 Compare in the same book the work of Brown in KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 146-150. 
47 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 146. 
48 The use of the phrase “corporate entity” here looks to suggest “autonomy” more than real “corporate group.” 
49 BROWN LEON CARL, The Religious Establishment in Husainid Tunisia, in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious 
Institutions in the Middle east since 1500 (Nikki R Keddie ed. 1972), at 73-4. 
50 BURKE III EDMUND, The Moroccan Ulama, 1860-1912: An Introduction, see KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 101. 
51 AHMAD AZIZ, Activism of the Ulama in Pakistan, in scholars, saints, and sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle east 
since 1500 (Nikki R Keddie ed. 1972), at 264.  
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who are not organized into formal institutions or unified guilds.52 This is why describing their 
operation as an imagined institution acting within a certain social sphere is more accurate than 
describing them as a corporate institution because, even when they formed corporate-like 
institutions, their power derived from their status as ulama–an imagined institution—rather than 
from their formal association with another institution. Miriam Hoexter puts it much better than I: 
“ulama were not acting as a concentrated group. They were hardly a “group” in the sociological 
meaning of the term. It was the expertise of the Sharia that gave them authority not their 
membership to a specific group.”53 
Thus, as Ephrat explains, the fluid and flexible label of ulama is what confers legitimacy despite the 
lack of official institutions and corporations.54 Moreover, we should not be surprised to see 
fragmentation of authority among contemporary Sunni scholars because such dispersion comes from 
the nature of the religion itself, at least according to one renowned commentator.55 Wael Hallaq has 
taken the extreme position of denouncing the whole idea of corporate personhood as being immoral 
and against Islamic law.56 What seems more accurate is that Islamic law does not contemplate or 
recognize a total dominance of corporate groups for Islamic scholars as a class, whose unifying 
function is the honorable one of interpreting Sharia. At the same time, the existence of corporate 
groups within the scholars as a class did help to perpetuate their work to the extent that they 
remained independent of state coercion.57 
To summarize my position here, there are four points. First, the madhabs are very loosely connected 
institutions that do not meet the criteria of guilds or corporate groups. Although I clearly admit that 
there are some corporate elements, there exist some resisting elements that keep madhabs from being 
completely corporate groups, or turn the sphere completely into organized corporate groups. The 
relationship of scholar to madhab is much looser still and is more imagined than it is formal. 
Although there have been more formal bodies in the past (meaning not madhabs but more formal 
institutions within particular geographic regions that constituted independent establishments), they 
have not encompassed all jurists nor do they explain the locus of juristic authority.58 Different 
madhabs and schools never constituted a single comprehensive corporate group that qualified for 
representing the community as a whole. Second, and perhaps most importantly, all this casting about 
to describe juristic authority as either corporate group via madhab or via some other formal 
 
52 HOEXTER MIRIAM et al., The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies, Suny Press 2002, at 21. 
53 HOEXTER, supra n. 52, at 123. 
54 EPHRAT, supra n. 2, at 6. 
55 EICKELMAN DALE, and others., Muslim Politics, Princeton University Press 2004, at 131. ZEGHAL, supra n. 14, at 372. 
56 HALLAQ WAEL, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament, Columbia University Press 2014, at 
153-4. 
57 It is worth reading the analysis by MUHAMMAD ZAMAN of the fragmentation of authority when he says, 
Throughout the Muslim-majority world, advancing levels of education, greater ease of travel, and the rise of new 
communications media have contributed to the emergence of a public sphere— some call it the “street”—in which large 
numbers of people, and not just an educated, political, and economic elite, want a say in political and religious issues. The result 
has been increasing challenges to authoritarianism and fragmentation of authority. ZAMAN, supra n. 14, at ix. 
On the other hand, in RAHEMTULLA’S estimation, the fragmentation of ulama left room for jihadists and extremists. In fact, it is 
the other way around. Fragmentation would protect the disagreements and diversity of opinions—the celebrated principles of 
jurisprudence. These fragmented individuals as a whole would dismiss the unidirectional discourse adopted by extremists and 
jihadists. Disagreements may allow for untraditional opinions or unorthodox discourse as well as a dangerous and extreme 
rhetoric but within the free sphere that by its nature dismiss the direct politics that is central to jihadists’ discourse. Moreover, 
the fragmentation protects from state control as well meaning provides legitimacy. Formalization of ulama and associating them 
with the state official institutions strip them from legitimacy, which leaves room for jihadists and extremists. Furthermore, going 
against the very nature of scholars does not fight extremism; rather, it helps extremists gain ground and free them to develop 
social networks that the official scholars lack. RAHEMTULLA, supra n. 14, at 34. 
58 Tunisia appears to be an example when al-Fasi and others popularly acted without being affiliated to the establishment or its 
institutions. He was dismissed from al-Zitouna, he resumed his teaching in the mosque. KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 77. 
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institution seems to presuppose a need to have such a formality and organization to exert political 
influence, and that is just wrong, as the next section shows.  
3. The Dispersed Influence 
The issue that occupies the debate of corporate group is whether the fractured Islamic jurists and 
scholars could constitute organized and formal institutions—either through “corporate groups” or 
through their affiliation to the madhab or other corporate, solidarity or pressure groups. If they 
succeed in establishing such group solidarity, was this group status powerful enough to dominate 
the jurisprudential activities. Similar to the debate on “religious institution,” the discussion of 
corporate group seems to have been premised on the idea that a corporate group is what assures the 
existence, leverage, and powerful sociopolitical influence of the community of jurists. Even when 
scholars agree with the existence of guilds, they tend to either point out the lack of overall corporate 
organization or the incapacity of the religious institutions to act as a concentrated group, thereby 
diluting their influence and rendering them largely marginal or irrelevant. It seems, for this 
approach, like if domination of corporate nature is what brings influence and strength.59  
What really seems to be missing from the argument is whether the overall comprehensive corporate 
group idea does any good to scholars as a community. Discussion on this is not completely absent in 
the literature, but it is comparatively rare.60Arguments concerning corporate groups (or the lack 
thereof) as formal institutions should be turned on their head since most of these arguments fail to 
recognize the very nature of the ulama. The ulama’s basic principle of disagreement among 
themselves preserves the dispersed authority they represent.61 This is not to say that corporate 
groups of different sorts did not influence society, jurisprudence, or politics. However, it is important 
to turn the focus to a more salient but less studied feature of scholars and jurists: fragmentation. This 
feature highlights their strengths and their freedom more than references to institutions or specific 
groups does.  
Hanbalis from the early existence during the time of the founder, Ibn Hanbal, appreciated the 
doctrine of disagreement (khilaf). When Ishaq bin Bahlul (d. 766) wrote a book on the different 
opinions of jurists cross-madhabs, he titled his book “the Disagreements.” When he presented it to Ibn 
Hanbal, the latter told him to title it “the flexibility” because jurisprudential disagreements serve the 
Muslim community by providing flexibility and different options for different conditions.62 Even 
within one Hanbali doctrine, Al-Khiraqi disagreed with al-Khallal in ninety questions.63 Ibn Hanbal 
himself seems to have more than one doctrine and approach according to Ibn Abi Ya‘la. Ibn Hamid 
tells the disagreement over whether Ibn Hanbal has two contradicting or different doctrines: old and 
new.64 
The followers of Ibn Hanbal continued the tradition of honoring disagreements. Al-Hasan al-Banna 
al-Baghdadi wrote a book reconciling the jurisprudence of al-Shafi‘i and Ibn Hanbal to bring together 
 
59 HOEXTER, supra n. 52, at 123. 
60 See the brief discussion of some of the positive side non-corporate nature of ulama, ZEGHAL, supra n. 14, at 372; EPHRAT, supra n. 
2, at 6; RAHEMTULLa, supra n. 14, at 17. 
61 For the concept of disagreement (khilaf) see e.g. IBN TAYMIYYAH, Raf' al-Malam 'an al-'Aemmah al-'Alam, The General Presidency 
of Scholarly Research and Ifta 1992, at 8-35; ALJAWZEYYAH, supra n. 38, at 40-205. 
62 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 1:104. 
63 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 2:64. 
64 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 2:149. 
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the followers of the two schools.65 One unique case of the Hanbalis is Abu al-Wafa’ Ibn ‘Aqeel (d. 
1119). 
Ibn Rajab tells that Ibn ‘Aqeel’s conduct resembles the early mystical (Sufi) school. According to Ibn 
Rajab, Ibn ‘Aqeel studied every subject and science from their masters whether hadith, fiqh, poetry, 
Quran or its exegesis etc. Ibn ‘Aqeel was proud that he learned from the best people in each subject. 
He walked with his teachers, sat with them, listened, and attended their lectures. Ibn ‘Aqeel said 
about his life and learning, my father’s side was a house of learning and education and they were 
[practicing] on the school of Abi Hanifah. I was following the resources of learning wherever they 
are, while some of my Hanbali friends wanted me to stick to Hanbali learning circles and Hanbali 
teachers. I would have missed a lot of learning had I listened to their advice. I would sit in Abu ‘Ali 
al-Mansour’s learning circle and he would bring me closer to him and present me to other students 
and authorize me to issue fatwas [Islamic response] despite the presence of older students and 
scholars. Nothing could take me from my beliefs and opinions, not a Sultanic blackmail nor a societal 
pressure. I was put in harm’s way from both some of colleagues and from rulers. The colleagues 
campaigned against me to the degree of asking for my blood, while the rulers threatened with 
imprisonment and chase but I feared no one but Allah and loved nothing more than knowledge. 
Despite what I suffered and some of my colleagues’s prejudice, I found that most of the students 
who follow Hanbali school exercise self-control, and most of their teachers act with temperance and 
cleanness.66      
Ibn ‘Aqeel was a case of Hanbalis who sees that being an honest Hanbali means to surpass 
superficial jurisprudential borders, and to learn from anyone, and communicate with every madhab 
affiliate. While his conduct and approach brought him to be of the highest Hanbalis and jurist, he 
complained from some Hanbalis and others who targeted him just because he was an unorthodox 
Hanbali. Ibn Rajab commented on Ibn ‘Aqeel’s approach attributing the calamity that happned to Ibn 
‘Aqeel to the fact that he was attending learning circles of some Mu‘tazalis, orientalistically called 
Rationalists, like Ibn al-Walled and Ibn al-Tabban, and read on them in theology and was influenced 
by that.67 Also influenced by Sufism, Ibn ‘Aqeel wrote and apologetic book for Mansour al-Hallaj (d. 
922) and his theology but he later retracted it and admitted that al-Hallaj was wrong and that there 
was a consensus among scholars during al-Hallaj’s time that the latter was wrong.68 In the year of 
1082, when a conflict erupted between Hanbalis and other madhabs, Ibn ‘Aqeel distanced himself and 
focused more on teaching and, thus, he was saved. He once was on a debate, and when he was told 
that what he is arguing for is not consistent with the Hanbali school, he replied, “I have my own 
independent ijtihad.”69 
The case of Ibn ‘Aqeel is blatant that ijtihad, disagreement, and jurisprudential flexibility exist and 
defeat the generalization of corporate group that needs more solidarity than flexibility. Ibn ‘Aqeel 
got his position as a leading Hanbali jurist in the eleventh century by caring less about affiliation and 
 
65 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 1:28. 
66 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 1:119-25. 
67 The Mu‘tazili school is presented as the Islamic rationalists in the medieval Islam or the defenders of reason, see HOURANI 
GEORGE FADLO, Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of ʻabd al-Jabbār, Oxford University Press 1971, at 1-17; MARTIN RICHARD C. and 
others, Defenders of Reason In Islam: Mu'tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol, Oneworld Publications Limited 
1997, at 10. 
68 Mansour al-Hallaj was a famous mystical figure in Islam. He was executed because he preached and called for the doctrine of 
unity of existence. The doctrine means to unify humans and probably everything with God and, thus, considering everything to 
be God. See in general, MASSIGNON LOUIS, The Passion of al-Hallaj: Mystic and Martyr of Islam, Princeton University Press 1994, 
at 1-23. 
69 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 1:118-38. 
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focusing on the Hanbali knowledge and authority. While there are other cases of the opposite 
according to the opposing parties of Ibn ‘Aqeel, both Ibn ‘Aqeel and his enemies, exist in broader 
sphere that allowed them to compete and fight over authority more than being strictly 
institutionalized Hanabalis. The dispersed influence of their jurisprudence is what matters at the 
end. As I discussed in the third section, this sphere of influence encompasses guild members and 
non-guild scholars, jurists related to the state and those acting outside of it. The most important 
aspect is that the ulama regardless of their loose or firm affiliation with formal or imagined schools 
act at some point as individuals who are responsible only to themselves and their authority.  
III. Formations of the Scholar: The Role of Ulama  
The first section of this article draws attention to the manner in which scholars and jurists operated 
as an imagined institution rather than a formal religious one. It also showed how scholars retained 
influence despite the absence of any all encompassing association or corporate group. In this section, 
I will present the role and basic functions of the Hanbali scholars and jurists.70 The scholars’ roles and 
modes range from being cooperative with the state, to semi-independent, to resistant and 
oppositional. Considering the traditional roles and formations of the scholar, I will finally address 
modern responses of ulama to the many calls for change in their traditional roles. 
1. The Weapon of Speech 
The depiction of Islamic scholars as having the “weapon of speech” is proudly used in Islamic 
jurisprudence.71 This image implies that their strength is not tangible or coercive like their political 
counterparts but rather moral and intellectual.72In fact, this weapon of tongue and pen alike is often 
deemed in Islamic discourse to be more important than the influence of political actors themselves. 
When Abdul-Rahman al-Jabarti, classified the categories of Muslim society, he placed the scholars in 
the second ranking right after the prophets and before the rulers and kings.73 With this ranking, it is 
no wonder that the ulama say the pen is mightier than the sword.74 As a result of this intangible 
weapon, they enjoyed privileges and exercised influence on different aspects of society, in a manner 
that could be more influential than those of political actors. This is demonstrated by the fact that, in 
addition to their own considerable funds from endowments and schools, they were exempted from 
taxation.75 
2. The Essential Functions 
 
70 It is not my intention to lay down all roles and functions of scholars and jurists nor to cover Islamic history but to focus on roles 
and modes related to the issue of their relationship to the state, constitutional order, or the ruler in a way that adds and helps 
our understanding of the issue.  
71 In his long biographies of the scholars, AL-DHAHABI narrated a story about Ibn Hazim, a famous jurist from Andalusia, likening 
his tongue to the sword of al-Hajjaj, a bloody ruler in Islamic history. The comparison invokes the soft power of knowledge vis-
à-vis the hard power of force and direct politics. AL-DHAHABI SHAMS AL-DEEN, Sear A'lam al-Nubla', Al-Risalah Publisher 2001, 
at  18:199. 
72 See HATINA, supra n. 9, at 209. 
73 ABDUL-RAHMAN AL-JABARTI, 'Aja'ib al-Aathar, Dar al-Kutub al-Arabiyyah 1998 (Abdul-Raaheem Abdul-Raheem ed.), at 1:14-5. 
74 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 150. In his book, al-Fikr al-Usuli (the Jurisprudential Thought), ABDUL-MAJEED AL-SAGHEER brilliantly and 
somewhat overly presented the literature and acts of ulama as a production of the persistent and continuous conflict between 
scholars and rulers, or may be between religion and politics. AL-SAGHEER ABDUL-MAJEED, Al-Fikr Al-Asuli, Dar al-Muntakhab 
al-‘Arabi 1994, at 7-19. However, I interpret the same struggle as continuous attempts of scholars to protect the sphere that 
maintains their freedom of debate and interpretations and, most of the time, not over direct power. 
75 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 133. 
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One central function and role of scholars is to bear, carry and interpret the principles of Islamic law. 
To teach the rules and principles of Islam and to call upon society to act according to them are 
essential functions of ulama as well. As a result of these roles, they are often called to administer 
Islamic law as well, which itself then becomes an additional, fundamental role.76 The types of roles 
and functions of ulama and jurists conform to their typical interactions with people because Islamic 
law itself is the texts interpreted within the circumstances and environment of a given society at a 
given time.  
In addition to their basic functions, or perhaps because of them, scholars are seen as “guardians of 
faith,” “protectors of the religion,” or “bearers of Islam.”77 Although this is arguably true, they have 
these roles due to their sociopolitical influence more than because of the exercise of any sort of direct 
power. From this perspective and more accurately, scholars are the bearers of knowledge and 
jurisprudence, as well as the protectors of the faith and religion of the people and the nation 
(ummah).  
Scholars are therefore the most vocal demonstration of the nation’s fundamental religious duties.78 
As Hoexter indicates:  “From the early Islamic times, the ummah (nation), not the ruler was bearer 
and interpreter of the norm and basic values of the proper Islamic social order. The ruler was 
responsible for the implementation of the rules.”79 Within the nation, scholars are the group most 
associated with the work of defending and protecting the Islamic doctrine that defines it. 
3. The Authority Holders 
As indicated above, because Islamic law is a jurist’s law, jurists carry the authority that sustains it.80 
Exercising the authority is not facilitated only through controlling Islamic texts and traditions, but 
also by controlling the taxes and endowments. Hanbalis and other jurists try to set out basic qualities 
for anyone to be a jurist. Ibn Hanbal said about himself that he spent five years in the subject of 
menstruation and its jurisprudence until he understood it.81 He, then, said that nobody can present 
himself for jurisprudential ruling as a mufti until he acquire certain qualities: good faith and 
intention, patience, quietness, tranquility, being well-versed in his subjects, adequacy, and knowing 
people.82 Therefore, Ibn Hanbal did not forget the importance of interacting with people, learning 
them and leaning on them.In this sense, scholars are the legitimacy givers who, in turn, lean on 
people for credibility and support.83 I put emphasis on the jurists’ role regarding authority because 
locating this authority takes on a greater importance in the course of deciding the sphere in which 
the ulama work. 
If we to apply the claim-versus-belief formula developed by Ricoeur,84 the self-proclaimed 
authoritativeness of ulama can be examined in people’s reaction and support of what cab bel called 
these meta-constitutional authority, an authority developed in a space beyond mere constitutional 
 
76 See ALJAWZEYYAH, supra n. 38. Al-Baghdadi al-Khateeb, Al-Faqeeh Wal Mutafaqqeh. 2007. See also KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 33-152. 
77 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 115. 
78 See FELDMAN NOAH, The Fall and Rise of Islamic State, Princeton University Press 2008, at 10-14. 
79 HOEXTER, supra n. 52, at 123. 
80 HALLAQ WAEL, Juristic authority vs. state power: the legal crises of modern Islam, 19 Journal of law and religion (2004), at 248; 
KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 308. 
81 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 1:250. 
82 HALLAQ, supra n. 80, at 245-7. 
83 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 115. 
84 TAYLOR GOERGE, Paul Ricoeur and the Task of Political Philosophy, Lexington 2012, at 66-67; RICOEUR PAUL, Lectures on 
Ideology and Utopia, Columbia University Press 1986, at 202-203. For Weber’s original idea about the claims of authority, see 
WEBER MAX, On Charisma and Institution Building, University of Chicago Press 1968, at 46-47. 
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framework. Throughout Islamic history, the mere existence of ulama’s meta-constitutionalism 
indicates the belief and trust of people in this authority. The following pages will try to review the 
main political modes of ulama, and how meta-constitutionalism existed in different forms within 
these imagined institutions. 
IV. The Political Modes of Ulama 
The literature on scholars and their political presence fluctuates reductively between portraying 
them as bureaucratic religious officials and mediators, or presenting them as mass leaders and 
prominent figures of opposition.85 In fact, the political influence of scholars was quite significant, and 
can be divided into five main types, as discussed below. These are activism, mediation, consultation, 
counterbalance and withdrawal. 
The analysis that presents scholars as government officials or state institutions as well as mediators 
and brokers between people and the state seems self-contradictory. Mediators are presumed not to 
be officially members of one party; otherwise, their mediation would be entirely compromised. Some 
researchers address this problem by describing different types or modes of scholars. They conclude 
that ulama are divided into two groups. One group is an official religious institution with members 
and functionaries, while the other is less reliant on the state and serves as a mediatory class that is 
always suspicious of the state.86 Still others summarize responses of scholars toward political events 
as either being in total opposition or as passive withdrawal.87  
All of these accounts fall short of presenting other possible responses and fail to include other 
influential groups of scholars that were not considered, due to the reductionist approach in defining 
and dealing with Muslim scholars. Because ulama by their very nature are a dispersed authority, we 
should look at them as belonging to diverse groups in society, whether they were peripheral, madhab 
jurists as corporate group or otherwise, official state ulama or others unaffiliated with any formal 
institution. Due to their authority working mainly in a sphere that is (or at least in an ideal sense is 
supposed to be) uncontrollable even if they happen to work in the bureaucracy, ulama may resort to 
their own sphere if they are to issue fatwas or to work generally as scholars or jurisconsults. 
I will present examples, focusing on pre-modern Hanbalis, of different modes of political 
engagement in order to prove the existence of a wider space available for different types of jurists 
and scholars—a space where they mainly acted as scholars but with vastly different capacities. 
1. Outside Bureaucracy: Religious Activism 
One prominent mode of scholars in regard to politics is their activism outside state institutions, or 
sometimes against them. I avoid simplifying their activism as “opposition” because in many cases it 
is not. Opposition in the contemporary state system means being able or willing to replace the 
government, or it may mean the competition over direct political power. Other understandings of 
opposition presume the operation of a coherent group, which leads back to the debate about whether 
 
85 Researchers do this sometimes in a contradictory way. Many researchers swing back and forth between describing the role 
ulama played either as part of the government or as mediators and brokers between the government and people. See e.g. 
KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 150,153-165-172. 1972; Hatina, supra n. 9, at 58-74. 2010; EPHRAT, supra n. 2, at 113; JACKSON, supra n. 20, at 
170; HOEXTER, supra n. 52, at 23. 
86 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 72-3. 
87 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 176. 
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the scholars are a corporate or pressure group.88 In all these situations, scholars cannot be described 
as simply a form of opposition. Therefore, I use “activism,” following Aziz Ahmed and others, to 
generally describe the scholars’ actions outside the state’s official sphere.89 The illustrations here are 
just examples of the long and diverse activism of scholars. I present them to help demonstrate the 
role of ulama in politics as independent moral watchdogs. Rebellion, public pressure and protests are 
examples of the forms that scholastic activism could take.90 In his book about the relationship 
between ulama and rulers, Abdul-Aziz al-Badri presents countless cases and names of scholars in 
Islamic history that “stood” in front of the rulers and challenged the government, and thus, they paid 
a toll with persecution, pressure, imprisonment or even execution.91 
A silent repeated move among Hanbalis, and probably scholars in general, is to resort to the mosque 
and to teach in learning circles instead of institutions endowed by political elites. This happens as a 
juristic defiance to the political ban and to the outside attempts to control scholars. Ibn Sam‘un (d. 
997) was a Hanbali preacher who took to the mosque to preach despite the ban on preaching from 
the ruler. He was brought to the ruler’s court and defended his position and found his way to 
convince the ruler.92 At the same period, another Hanbali preached the ruler and reminded him of 
the Islamic role of the jurists until the ruler wept out of emotions and allowed for such activities.93 
When Ibn Sam‘un died in 997 and was buried in his home, the people of Damascus were outraged by 
the fact that he didn’t have a proper funeral so they dug his grave and took his body to the great 
mosque in the city, and a lot of people prayed on him and buried him. The funeral, then, was a 
popular message.94 Hanbalis narrated to their founder Ibn Hanbal that he said, “our promised 
meetings are the day of funerals,” meaning that huge funerals that are attended by large number of 
people are the signs of strength and truth.95 
Ibn Rajab does not miss the chance to complement principled Hanbalis who never feared the rulers 
nor the people. He gives the example of Abdul-Khaliq Bin ‘Isa (d. 1077) who “always said the truth 
and never favored a person of position or influence. In the matters of Allah, he never shied away. He 
moved between five mosques and taught in them….”96 He was “the final destination to travel for 
students of the school of Ibn Hnabal” and “was undisputedly leader of Hanblis in his time.” 
According to Ibn Rajab, Ibn ‘Isa “was appreciated by the ruler but also never took anything from the 
ruler in return for matters of this life.” This is why he built his reputation and popular strength to the 
extent that two subsequent rulers in Baghdad started their reign by going to the mosque and asking 
allegiance from Ibn ‘Isa.97 In 1071, Hanbalis went to the Great Mosque close to the Palace of the ruler 
and requested to eliminate bars, investigate selling wines in the city, and fight corruption and 
corruptors. The Caliph ‘Adhud al-Dawlah responded positively.98  
 
88 For the meaning of “opposition” in the contemporary context see BLONDEL JEAN, Political Opposition in the Contemporary 
World, Government and Opposition (1997), at 32. 
89 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 257. 
90 See RAHEMTULLA, supra n. 14, at 17. 
91 ABDUL-AZIZ AL-BADRI, Al-Islam Bain al-Ulama and al-Hukkam, al-Maktabah al'ilmayyah n.d., at 129-244.( Ironically, the author 
himself ended up to be another case of these inquisitions of scholars; he was executed by Ahmed al-Bakr’s regime in Iraq in 
1969). 
92 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 2:158. 
93 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 2:159. 
94 IBN ABI YA'LA, supra n. 15, at 2:161. 
95 ISMAIL IBNUMAR IBN KATHIR, al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah, Dar 'alam Al-kutub 2003, at 10:342. 
96 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 1:12-5. 
97 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 1:12-5. 
98 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 1:12-5. 
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Later After the death of a Hanbali scholar, some Mu‘tazili wanted to proselytize the sect of Mu‘tazili 
but al-Shareef Abu Ja‘far (d. 1077) rushed to the great mosque of al-Mansour and reestablished the 
Hanbali doctrine with the other scholars of the people of hadith. For Ibn Rajab, “this is when the 
people of the Tradition and Sunnah were happy. The Book of Tawheed was read there too. All who 
were present agreed to support the [traditional Hanbali] doctrine.”99 
Around the year 1077 in Baghdad, the “calamity of Ibn al-Qushairi” took place. The basic facts are 
that Ibn al-Qushairi (d. 1120) accused Hanbalis of theological heresy. The accusation was that 
Hanbalis embody Allah and liken Him to human beings. Some influential scholars leaned toward al-
Qushairi’s accusation and believed it, and, then, al-Qushairi and others resorted to the ruler 
complaining against Hanbalis. When the students of al-Shareef Abu Ja‘far, the representative of 
Hanbalis, learned that their teacher was targeted by the group of al-Qushairi, they assigned some of 
them to protect their teacher at the doorsteps of the mosque. When both groups met, it turned violent 
and one passerby was killed as a result of the chaos. Both parties wrote to different political rulers: 
the Caliph and the Minister. The latter brought the leader of both parties to stop involving violence 
and ordinary people in their doctrinal conflict. When they refused, the Minister wrote to the Caliph. 
The Caliph then ordered house arrest for al-Shareef and exile for al-Qushairi and this is when the 
calamity of Ibn al-Qushairi came to an end.100 
While the story itself does not technically present a case of activism, it shows how jurists respond to 
different actors of the society and how they interact with the rulers. More importantly, it shows again 
the persisting nature of the jurists to protect their juristic domain. They can defy politicians and 
expose themselves to danger, violence, and exile in order to draw a line that protects the 
jurisprudence of Ibn Hanbal and more the religion of Islam. For many Hanbalis and others, 
involving rulers in matters of jurisprudence could distort the doctrine and jeopardize the principle. 
This is why they refused to follow political favorite doctrines, and even to keep silent about other 
minor opinions that they held. Al-Harawi said that he was brought to be executed five times in order 
to just keep quiet, let alone to change his juristic opinions, but he refused and survived all times.101 
In Egypt, the case of the scholar al-‘izz bin Abdul-Salam (d. 1262) is a striking one. In Islamic history, 
he was given the title the “Sultan of the Ulama” in appreciation of his bold moves in addition to his 
scholastic books on jurisprudence and jurisprudential politics. He was imprisoned and persecuted 
because of his activism and outspokenness. When Ibn Abdul-Salam noticed the influence the slaves 
of the Sultan Ayyub gained, he became alarmed and tended to invalidate the transactions they 
would make, which angered them. The slaves, who would become rulers later, complained and 
drove a wedge between the Sultan and Ibn Abdul-Salam. This led to an extreme confrontation with 
the ruler, as a result of which Ibn Abdul-Salam packed and started leaving Cairo with people and 
nobles following him. This forced the ruler and ruling elites into a position where they had to accept 
his authority and judgment and urge him to stay in order to stabilize society.102 This example helps to 
demonstrate the power of the ulama when they choose the path of activism. Despite the fact that this 
scholar did not have a formal position or political office, he could influence politics through societal 
and popular pressure. 
Activism could take many other forms as well. Scholars engaged in public affairs based on their 
understanding of the moral obligations and religious principles that they promoted. They pressured 
 
99 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 1:15. 
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rulers as they did in the example of “Salat al-Raghaib” during the Ayyubid period (from the twelfth 
to the thirteenth centuries). Salat al-Raghaib is the prayer performed on the first Friday of the month 
of Rajab. The scholars opposed the general practice of this prayer on the grounds that it is an 
innovative religious practice. The ruler responded to their demands accordingly.103 During the 
eleventh century, jurists gathered to protest against drinking wine, charging interest, and allowing 
prostitution. This protest is an important sign of the relationship between these protesting jurists and 
the state.104   
Not only pre-modern scholars protested or challenged orders that threatened their own morals or 
interests, but also some early modern scholars took the lead in defending the interests of the general 
public. Activist ulama were not only a Hanbali feature, but a mode that many other ulama exercised. 
In 1794, in Egypt after the Mamluk, the rulers of Egypt, introduced taxes on goods, the scholars 
fiercely opposed taxation. They led a general strike against the ruler to stop tax exploitation and, in 
the end, the rulers negotiated with the ulama and the taxes were repealed.105  
Another kind of activism, and one that could mark the climax of ulama’s influence, was challenging 
the authority of existing rulers. They could morally, in the form of a fatwa, delegitimize one ruler in 
favor of another, as they did many times throughout history when they perceived the public interest 
better served by the challenger.106 In this context, Umar Makram (d. 1822) is an important name. He 
graduated from al-Azhar and rose among the nobles and scholars of Egypt during the French 
colonization (1798-1801). The ulama, under the leadership of Umar Makram, organized a popular 
mobilization and recognized the challenger Muhammad Ali as the legitimate ruler of Egypt over the 
existing Wali. It was a moment when Egyptians chose their own government in 1807.107 Not long 
after that, Umar Makram told Muhammad Ali himself that the people had the right to remove any 
unfit ruler.108 
Scholars’ activism of this sort has become particularly intense in the modern era, in the context of 
resisting colonization and occupation. The jurist Rawaq, dubbed “the Sheikh of the Blind”, led the 
first opposition against the French in Egypt. Beyond Rawaq, the ulama, in general, orchestrated the 
resistance movement.109 
The Urabi movement (1879-1882) was a popular mobilization that ended up fighting the British 
intervention in Egypt. The Urabi movement in Egypt was named after Ahmed Urabi, a popular 
soldier who decided to reject the unpopular policies of Taufeeq, the ruler of Egypt. Scholars proved 
to be a critical component of the movement he inspired. It is worth noting that the Urabi movement 
attracted diverse scholars from “both sides of the aisle,” from those described as conservatives like 
Illysh to those who were reformists like Muhammad Abduh.110 Illysh, Mansour al-Adawi, al-
Haddad, and Salim al-Bishri were among the ulama who contributed to the Urabi revolution.111 In 
1879, al-Bakri with his friends and other scholars issued the “National Charter” to request a 
constitutional monarchy in 1879, but Khedive challenged the move and sent al-Bakri into exile.112 
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Later, a popular fatwa by ulama, signed by 10,000 people, delegitimized Taufeeq and called for a 
fight against the British occupation.113 Despite the official position of the Grand Mufti of al-Azhar, 
the majority of professors and students joined the revolutionaries against the Khedive Taufeeq, the 
contested ruler of Egypt who was supported by the British.114 Scholars who supported the Urabi 
movement paid an expensive toll as some were dismissed from al-Azhar, some were imprisoned like 
Illysh who was 80 years old, and others faced exile like Abduh.115  
The Urabi movement inspired similar activism on the part of ulama in Morocco who opposed the 
monopoly of tobacco by the government of Hasan I (1873-1894) and who wanted to defend public 
interests against the alliance of big merchants and ruling elites. The scholars issued an opinion 
condemning the monopoly, which came as a shock to the King. The King addressed the issue and 
tried to calm the public.116 
After the Urabi movement, al-Azhar participated in the 1919 revolt in Egypt. This revolution was led 
by Saad Zaghlul (d. 1927) who graduated from al-Azhar and was one of Muhammad Abduh’s 
disciples. The movement broke out against the British occupation of Egypt and demanded national 
independence. The revolutionaries frequently met in the homes of the scholars.117 The movement 
was organized by the collective efforts of the national activists like Zaghlul and the other members of 
al-Wafd as a national delegation.118 The ulama generally contributed to the independence of Egypt by 
signing a petition to Britain that Egypt should be free and independent.119 
The Activism of scholars was a traditional way in which ulama sought to challenge the status quo, 
and one that they embraced. Another manner in which they engaged the state was in the role of 
mediators and peace brokers, as the next section shows. 
2. Mediation Role 
It could be said that because jurists never occupied an official political position for their religiosity, 
they continued for a long time to mediate on behalf of the people with the political authorities in the 
state in order to voice the needs and interests of the people.120 Ephrat thinks that ulama served as 
mediators because of the “heterogeneous character of their socioeconomic background and 
networks, and their close ties with the urban populace….”121  
An interesting aspect of the scholars’ role as mediators is that it serves a dual function. The first is 
defending the public and people’s interests against the ruler’s exploitation and overstep, and the 
second is being in charge of calming people down from the ruler’s side. “Ulama served a 
communication tool between the ruler and the ruled for the ruler to manipulate the public.”122 A 
perfect example of this occurred during the Urabi Revolution when the Khedive Taufeeq singled out 
ulama as responsible for public order and for ensuring the obedience of the people while these ulama 
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and others were carrying the people’s demands to him.123 Even at times of occupation and 
colonization, some ulama tended to work with the de facto rulers so they carried on in their role of 
representing people but to the colonizing forces this time. During the French occupation in Egypt, 
some ulama represented the public before the French, while other ulama represented the public 
against the French. 124  
In order for ulama to resume their mediatory task, they need to be independent of the state’s 
bureaucracy, as they cannot mediate if they work for one side and part (of the state); otherwise, they 
will lose the confidence of the public as faithful mediators.  
3. The Consultation Role 
One of the most famous judges (qadis) in Islamic history is the noted early Hanafi jurist Abu Yusuf 
(d. 798). His book about the land tax, al-Kharaj, is a jurisprudential hallmark. He started the book by 
saying, the “caliph instructed me to write a book for him to study and act upon.”125 The book, in other 
words, grew out of Abu Yusuf’s role of consultant and enabled the Caliph to act upon the rules that 
Abu Yusuf set. The famous political jurisprudence theorist, al-Mawardi (d. 1058) is another example 
of a jurist who played the role of consultant when he wrote al-Ahkam al-Shar‘iyyah, which has proved 
to be one of the hallmarks in political jurisprudence. This work was prepared under the instruction 
of the ruler al-Qadir Billah (d. 1031) in order for him to “study and act upon” it.126 Al-Juwaini (d. 
1085),127 and his student, al-Ghazali (d. 1111),128 produced similar books to instruct future rulers on 
how to follow Islamic principles. 
The custom of the ruler consulting scholars and scholars writing books or rulings of jurisprudence in 
response demonstrates how the consultation function worked between some scholars and rulers in 
Islamic history. The practice of consultation was not just a tradition established in the ulama’s 
practice and literature, it was also a custom and principle on the rulers’ part. Rulers like Nizam al-
Mulk, a Seljuk ruler (d. 1092), advised rulers to consult learned scholars especially the experienced 
ones.129 The objectives of scholars in their services as advisors were to maintain the cooperation and 
understanding of rulers, and thereby have influence in the implementation of Islamic principles that 
would in their judgment maximize the interests of the public while furthering their own longer-term 
interests and influence as well.130 
Around the 1100s, Abu Saad al-Baqqal al-Baghdadi was used to preach in the presence of the Caliph 
al-Mustadhhir. He once preached Nizam al-Mulk that “Allah could turn his [fancy] wooden door 
into his casket…. Al-Baqqal added, addressing Nidham al-Mulk, you have no choice but to follow 
Allah’s rules because you’re the agent of the [Islamic] nation unlike ordinary individuals. [You are ] 
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an agent who is responsible to take care of the interests of people and report to the higher political 
authority of this life, and to Allah in the Hereafter.131  
This custom of playing the role of consultation was not exclusive for Hanbalis nor only in the 
medieval Islam. With the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, scholars and sultans reached an 
important level of cooperation and consultation where ulama who played a large part in bringing 
what one scholar regards as “a major achievement of the Empire, namely the endowment of Islamic 
law, in its Hanafi form.”132 This role of consultant continued even during the codification when the 
traditional role of scholars within the state was at stake. The ulama who justified the change and 
facilitated the codification feared that if the change was adopted without their presence, it might 
have worsened their position as scholars. The attitude of some ulama to justify codification was, 
therefore, based on the fear that the entire process would take place without their input at all if they 
did not participate.133 The effort in the end, however, delegitimized not just some of the scholars 
involved in the codification process but the state as well. The effort was seen as justifying late 
Ottoman tyranny and monopoly of power rather than as an effort to implement Islamic law.  
Consultation worked in cases where the ulama consulted were associated in one way or another with 
the ruler, sultan, or government, such that the scholar acquired the confidence of the ruler. In the 
absence of such trust, it is unlikely that a jurist could have played this role effectively.  
4. The Official Counterbalance 
Despite partial subordination of ruler-friendly ulama to the people in power, these ulama were still 
able to function as an official counterbalance. According to Feldman, the compromise was that jurists 
offer legitimacy to the order as a realistic compromise for the acceptance of the status quo as a means 
of then exercising influence and using pressure to ensure Sharia compliance in society.134 Feldman 
presents al-Ghazali and al-Mawardi as examples.135 The move may be read, then, not as a scholarly 
concession to power, but as a brilliant maneuver that successfully preserved the law and the scholars 
in their constitutional position even after the caliphate had failed in its assigned task of preserving 
orderly government.136 
From the Hanbali jurisprudential history, Yahya bin Hubairah al-Wazeer (the Minister, d. 1165) 
represents probably the highest Hanbali official in the Abbasid state. Unlike al-Ghazali, and al-
Mawardi and some others, Ibn Hubairah served in the government as a bureaucratic minister. 
According to Ibn Rajab, Ibn Hubairah was poor until he was brought to the Sultanic services and was 
promoted until became a minister during the rule of al-Muqtafi li Amrillah. Ibn Hubairah was then 
praised a lot and was called different great titles by the people for his position and dedicated 
learning. However, he refused to be called the lord of ministers. He said that Allah calls Aaron a 
minister to Moses, and the Prophet called Jibreel and Mika’eal his ministers in the heavens while 
Abu Bakr and ‘Omar are his ministers on earth. Thus, Ibn Hubairah wouldn’t allow himself to be 
called the lord of these great people and angels who should be called lords themselves. When Ibn 
 
131 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 1:90. 
132 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 29. 
133 LAYISH AHARON, Die Welt des Islams, 2004, at 89-101. 
134 FELDMAN, supra n. 78, at 50-1, 38-9. 
135 I do not agree with analysis that al-Ghazali has a similar move to al-Mawardi. This is because al-Ghazali’s authorship of the 
book, Sirr al-‘almeen, is really disputed and I believe it is not his. See AL-DHAHABI, , supra n. 71, at ' 19/328. In addition, this 
approach of being ruler-friendly does not fit the whole works and moves of al-Ghazali like his criticism of the association with 
sultans in his infamous book, ABU HAMID AL-GHAZALI, Ihya' 'Ulum al-Deen, Kiriata Futra n.d., at 66-8 § 1. 
136 FELDMAN, supra n. 78, at 39 
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Hubairah held the position of minister he brought closer to him the scholars, and best of people in 
learning circles and the people of worship. He benefitted the people of knowledge and Sunnah as 
best as he could, May Allah bring mercy upon him.137 
Ibn Hubairah once was in a learning debate with al-Ashtari al-Maliki, a jurist following the school of 
Malik, and al-Ashtari attributed to Malik an opinion that is, in fact, not Malik’s. Then, Ibn Hubairah 
tried to correct him but al-Ashtari insisted on that, until Ibn Hubarah brought the authoritative book 
from both resources, Malik and Ibn Hanbal, and won the argument. Following this incident, Ibn 
Hubairah asked al-Ashtari to apologize for the people of knowledge for claiming something that was 
not true but he refused. Then, Ibn Hubairah called him a name and cursed him. The next session, Ibn 
Hubairah started blaming himself for mistreating al-Ashtari and apologized for him, but al-Ashtari 
said he was the one who should apologize for telling a false fact. After that, a lot of people cried in 
the place and was emotional. 
Ibn Rajab described Ibn Hubairah as a jurist who served the Abbasids but highly respected the 
juristic sphere and respected its rules and borders. Ibn Hubairah once was shown a book that was 
brought to him from the library of the madrasa of al-Nizamiyyah, but he refused to read it and 
ordered it to be brought back since the terms of the endowment of the library stated that “no book 
should be brought outside it.” This was part of the Hanbali and other schools jurisprudential 
doctrine of “shart al-waaqif” that the endowment must be run completely according to the terms of 
the endower.138 During a learning circle in the mosque, Ibn Hubariah gave an example of how the 
terms of the endower should be respected. He said he once was not allowed to enter a madrasa 
because it was built exclusively for Shafi‘is and he was Hanbali.139 
Although he served in the Abbasid government, Ibn Hubairah maintained reasonable neutrality 
towards jurisprudential orientations, and respected the juristic sphere regardless of madhabs. Despite 
the fact that he was a learned jurist trained and affiliated with the Hanbali madhab, he said that 
mosques must not be affiliated with any school or jurisprudence, because they’re for Allah, like in 
the Quran “Mosques are not but for Allah.”140 Therefore, according to Ibn Hubairah, nobody can 
establish an exclusive mosque for some madhab or school within Islam because mosques must be 
open for all Muslims and serve all Muslims. He considers the act of specifying a mosque for a madhab 
or a jurisprudence as a bad innovation in Islam and against the verse of Quran that talks about “the 
Sacred Mosque, which We have made (open) to (all) men - equal is the dweller there and the visitor 
from the country.”141 Ibn Hubairah did not serve as an official counterbalance per se, but he was more 
like a political protector of the juristic domain. 
The official counterbalance seems to attempt to reach the same destination: protecting the free sphere 
of jurisprudence from the total political control. Samuel Eisenstadt described the relationship 
between ruler-friendly ulama and the rulers as a “tacit bargaining” that the public sphere is for the 
public, and that ulama are always free to operate in this arena.142 Ottoman ulama and modern Islamic 
scholars in the official counterbalance mode use their pressure to fight what they see as social and 
 
137 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 1:211-38. 
138 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 1: 215-20. 
139 IBN RAJAB, supra n. 17, at 1: 235. 
140 Quran (72:18). 
141 Quran (22:25). 
142 HOEXTER, supra n. 52, at 6-151. Compare the interesting analysis of Haider Hamoudi about different bargains that, sometimes, 
involved al-Najaf, religious institutions and scholars in the Iraqi constitutional context, HAMOUDI HAIDER ALA, Negotiating in 
Civil Conflict: Constitutional Construction and Imperfect Bargaining in Iraq, University of Chicago Press 2013, at 82,87,120,137-
141. 
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economic injustices.143 Official Ottoman ulama could even issue rulings that circumvented the 
Sultan’s will and order.144 When a university of sciences was open at the order of the Sultan 
Abdulmecid II in 1870s, Sheikh al-Islam Hasan Fehmi Efendi saw it as a rival to the traditional 
madrsa system so he issued a fatwa and campaigned against it and succeeded in closing it.145 
Because the rulers decided to engage ulama in their legitimation process, the rulers paid the toll of 
bending to the wind created by ulama and the society they represented. In this mutual-interest 
relationship, scholars developed their own jurisdiction and sphere and the state protected its own 
domain. So, the dispute sometimes seems to be over “whose jurisdiction should govern?” or “whose 
sphere is at stake?”  
The role of scholars as a counterbalance is sometimes vague due to the fact that the degree of 
“legitimacy” the ulama offer is often unclear and therefore perceived to be unconditional. It seems 
that al-Mawardi and the others would occasionally offer a temporary de facto solution to a political 
crisis by approving a ruler, but that solution could introduce a worse crisis when it is later used to 
justify forever de facto rule. Moreover, the “compromise” that brings scholars under the umbrella of 
the government ends up stripping them from real influence including counterbalance, and costs 
them their own legitimacy in the eyes of the public whom they should represent.146  
5. The Time of Withdrawal? 
A salient phenomenon that repeatedly appears when ulama react to political developments is what 
some describe as “withdrawal.” Interestingly, analysts’ definitions of withdrawal differ dramatically 
from complete silence, to denial of participation in the discussion, to denial of participation in official 
governance.147 In this section, I tend to revisit the analysis of withdrawal in light of the fact that 
scholars are characterized by fragmentation, and they each have their own space of influence. 
Some analysts like Jackson and Hatina tend to describe ulama’s response to politics as quietist. 
Quietism describes the wide range of methods that defer direct political questions or disputes over 
direct power to politicians or ruling elites that are directly involved in politics.148 In this sense, 
quietism means abandoning (direct) politics in order scholars to devote the time and effort to the 
religious or jurisprudential work and debates.    
Some analysts who present some ulama as quietists do not take into consideration the factor of 
whether these scholars are official, government-friendly ulama or non-official. Quietism does 
certainly exist in scholarly response to politics, but the point here is that the scholars’ quietism could 
be interpreted differently according to the locus that the scholar traditionally occupied.149 
If the literature that speaks of withdrawal does not interpret this move by ulama as a quietist 
approach toward public discussion, it will describe it as a method of avoiding troubles and adopting 
a passive reaction toward the serious issues in society.150 However, although passive withdrawal 
 
143 HATINA, supra n. 9, at 18-9. See ZAMAN, supra n. 14, at 108. 
144 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 33. 
145 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 41. 
146 HATINA, supra n. 9, at 134. 
147 Compare the following materials, JACKSON, supra n. 20, at 70; KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 117; HATINA, supra n. 9, at 18-58-9. 
148 JACKSON, supra n. 20, at 70; HATINA, supra n. 9, at 18-58-9. 
149 As an example of the analysis that does not make this differentiation see JACKSON, supra n. 20, at 70. Compare the Shi‘i Semi-
Quietism and Quietism in Hamoudi’s work, HAMOUDI HAIDER ALA, Between Realism and Resistance: Shiʿi Islam and the 
Contemporary Liberal State, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, 111-8 (2009), at 11. 
150 JACKSON, supra n. 20, at 70; KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 117; HATINA, supra n. 9, at 18/58-9. 
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happens, most of what is described as “withdrawal” seems to be a part of the scholars’ typical role of 
operating in their own sphere and refusing to give that up for direct political involvement. Unlike 
common conception of non-political moves as simply passive withdrawal, the non-political attitude 
of the ulama can be powerful due to the nature of their arena, networks and authority.  
It could be part of the confusing analysis of withdrawal as quietism is that it presupposes the 
modern state’s setting where real influence is primarily through direct politics and the state’s 
institutions.151 Because the analysis seems to reduce influence to the one of state institutions in the 
modern context, they assume the same setting when analyzing medieval Islamic scholars. 
Sherman Jackson, for instance, notes that medieval Islamic jurists ignored the question of the proper 
substantive political authority and dealt with procedural validity instead.152 He gives the example of 
Ibn Taymiyyah who “shifted the focus from the top to the bottom, people, and their relationship to 
the divine law.”153 This was the shift from the issue “who should rule” to “how should they 
rule.”154In studying al-Qarafi, Jackson points to the fact that “while Qarafi was conspicuously silent 
about the chaos and mayhem between the Ayyubids and the Mamluks, he finds time to address 
indiscretions that occur at a slighter lower level.”155  
With respect to al-Qarafi’s method in constitutional debates, his approach emphasizes that, although 
Islamic law should govern some conflicts, these conflicts reside outside the ulama’s own 
“jurisdiction.” As a result, the ulama exercise restraint in matters that might provoke political forces 
to invade matters normally within their arena. In addition, they developed a realist technique of 
“procedural validity” that has allowed them to serve people’s and society’s needs even when 
essential legitimacy of the state is at stake. Therefore, when scholars exercise restraint from becoming 
involved in politics, this is not always passive withdrawal and quietism, but it could be to a means of 
protecting their legal domain, or protesting the current setting as well. The line between these 
positions is not always fixed, but it is important to analyze the motives of scholars by looking at their 
literature to include all these possible factors in the analysis. 
Daniel Crecelius reads the ulama’s refusal to rule during colonization, for example, as the typical 
submissive role of ulama to engage with government and direct decision-making.156 This evaluation 
reduces the “active role” to being one that exists only by means of direct political governance and 
rule in the state as we know it today. In my opinion, the ulama’s refusal to rule was a remarkably 
smart one because they resumed their typical role of representing people in refusing to participate in 
forces that occupied their land, culture and political life. Ulama stripped the system of the French of 
its legitimacy and retained the legitimacy for themselves by proving to be independent and 
uninterested in power. Ulama, actually, put the French in a difficult situation because the French 
needed someone local to rule so they (the French) could indirectly rule but ulama refused this deal.157 
 
151 See HALLAQ, supra n. 80, at 50-7. 
152 JACKSON, supra n. 20, at XX. 
153 JACKSON, supra n. 20, at Xxii/70. 
154 JACKSON, supra n. 20, at 71. It is worth comparing the analysis of Carl Popper of the modern democratic shift of political question 
from “who rule” to “how”. POPPER KARL RAIMUND/BOSETTI GIANCARLO, The Lesson of This Century: With Two Talks on 
Freedom and The Democratic State, Psychology Press. 2000, at 9. 
155 JACKSON, supra n. 20, at XXii. 
156 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 174-6. 
157 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 71. It is fair to say that there are times and many cases of ulama’s legitimizing absolute tyranny with no 
return for the public interests but this is mostly considered a corrupt move more than a typical pattern acceptable of ulama. 
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There may be some element of passive withdrawal and quietism on the part of some ulama in certain 
contexts. However, Jackson ignores the fact that ulama can protest by withdrawal, which is powerful 
in light of the tools of legitimacy that they have.  
Thus, in the end, refusing to serve in politics is not merely withdrawal; it could also signal a 
powerful active reaction of protesting the status quo. In the case of scholars, it is even stronger when 
we know that the public could see their absence from the state as an attempt at delegitimization of 
the state. In addition, “withdrawal” could be a stand itself as it builds a space that is stronger and 
more attached to the people—an entirely different authority that the state does not control.158 It is fair 
to suggest that the way and the kind of withdrawal must be analyzed to interpret this move. 
In wars between two or more powers, scholars’ refraining from engagement is not always 
withdrawal as some may suggest,159 but rather a means of maintaining their role no matter which 
wins. For example, in the war between Ottomans and Mamluks, the scholar Arusi argued that his 
goal was the welfare of Muslim subjects, not the victory of either the Ottomans or the Mamluk.160 
When some scholars resort to their very locus to exercise influence, some commentators interpret this 
move as a kind of withdrawal. In explaining what some regard as a quietist approach, Hallaq hints at 
the separation of the legal and the political in medieval Islam.161 It is actually more of a revealing 
feature of the locus that the jurists and scholars work in rather than passively accepting the status 
quo.  
At any rate, whether withdrawal existed as much as some claim or not, this mode of withdrawal is 
one mode that scholars assume while they can and do assume other modes at other times. 
Sometimes, even when some ulama adopt one mode toward politics, other ulama adopt another 
mode. This is why, for example, we saw these different reactions toward one issue, one party, or 
government. 
In the following section, I will discuss the example of westernization that threatens the traditional 
role of modern scholars, and how they have reacted to it.  
 
 
 
 
 
158 This explains why the Saudi government, for example, takes popularity of “peripheral” ulama and jurists very seriously and 
may even imprison a popular scholar for being popular or prevent him from having regular learning circles. This is because this 
popularity builds a bigger space for a sphere that widens the scope of the influence of this out-of-the-state authority. In the 
course of building this authority, jurists could use an Islamic maxim of “multiplying the number of Muslims.” By this, jurists 
mean that even those who are not dedicated to a specific moral Islamic task (not jurists or dedicated students) can come and 
listen. The exercise of multiplying the numbers of people surrounding the learning circle and ulama functions to build a social 
support in the space where these jurists reside and exercise their influence.  
159 HATINA, supra n. 9, at 24. 
160 HATINA, supra n. 9, at 24. 
161 HALLAQ, supra n. 80, at 251 
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V. The Modern Mode: in the Course of “Change”: Between 
Reform and Westernization 
1. The Ulama and Legal Change 
When we discuss the roles of scholars and pre-modern Hanbali jurists and how these roles have 
shaped their domain, the response to change is fundamental. It becomes even more important when 
we see that the change could enhance the functions of scholars, and could, on the other hand, 
marginalize their influence and role. In this section, I will discuss how modern scholars reacted to the 
calls for change in their juristic domain. 
There are different approaches toward evaluating the importance of the role of scholars in the course 
of change in Muslim societies. One approach assumes that meaningful change comes from the 
westernized elites. Under this approach, scholars are not just less relevant but somehow a potential 
obstacle toward a useful change that an Islamic society might need.162 Some authors complain that 
the orientalist scholarship on ulama portrays them as foreign, if not opposed, to change and reform 
and that the “premodern Islamic legal tradition is a highly rigid structure, defined in opposition to 
the social and political institutions of society.”163 Another approach interprets the response of 
scholars as dependent on their interests and social position rather than their values and public 
interests. Therefore, scholars could pose a threat or lend support depending on how their interests as 
a group are protected.164 A third approach tends to portray ulama as “custodians of change” as long 
as public interests and values are not at stake.165  
This chapter takes the position that, although scholars vary and assume different modes, they 
maintain a very significant role in advocating for change that appeals to the public. If they cannot 
enhance the common good, they at least work to lessen the inevitable wrongs. They call for some 
change while they struggle against others.  
In his book of the rules of jurisconsult and ifta’, Ibn al-Qayyem (d. 1350), following a settled rule in 
Islamic jurisprudence, asserts that fatwas change according to the time, place, circumstances and 
customs.166 This at least recognizes the possibilities of legal change.  Other jurists have reached 
largely similar conclusions. Ibn Aabideen (d. 1836) authored a book that focuses on jurisprudential 
changes according to circumstances and environment.167 Therefore, jurists respond to people of their 
time in order to reach the best implementation possible of Islamic law. This is why, for example, 
Ebussuud Efendi (d. 1574), one of the most important scholars in the sixteenth century, relaxed a 
fatwa on endowments in order to respond to people’s needs.168 
With the modernization of our culture, we find reservations from scholars not on the principle of 
change, but rather on certain kinds of change, change that jeopardizes the values of people or 
threatens to invade the very free channels between people and scholars. This kind of change is 
 
162 See KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 136-9-145; HATINA, supra n. 9, at 33,83-138. Compare KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 14. 
163 ZAMAN, supra n. 14, at 17. 
164 See KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 107-191. 
165 ZAMAN, supra n. 14, at 17-9. See HATINA, supra n. 9, at 134; RAHEMTULLA, supra n. 14, at 84. 
166 ALJAWZEYYAH, supra n. 38, at 255 § 3. 
167 IBN ‘AABIDEEN, Nashr Al-'Urf Fi Bina' Al-Ahkam 'Ala Al-'Urf, Sayyed 'illysh n.d., at 114-48 § 2. See ZAMAN, supra n. 14, at 19. 
168 HOEXTER, supra n. 52, at 73. 
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commonly described as “westernization.”169 At the same time, scholars have embraced changes that 
elevated the quality of living and allowed for free interaction between people and scholars. “Some 
ulama did not encounter problems with dealings with modernity as they applied to public interest 
rule.”170 Therefore, reforms that fulfilled the requirements of serving public interest, the ulama would 
support and adopt, but those that stood against public interest, they were committed to opposing. 
Some debate revolves around whether certain aspects of modernization could be implicit 
mechanisms of colonization. This applies to ways of living, dress code, languages, cultures, and 
related matters.  Thus, some scholars warned against Western-style brimmed hats, jackets, and 
trousers171 while others allowed them.172 Similar reactions were narrated about fatwas against 
coffee,173 tea174 and cigarettes175 when they were attached to certain westernizing influences. The 
fatwas and rulings were relaxed on these issues when the ulama began to consider other aspects of 
those activities. 
Yet scholars were not opposed to other changes.  For example, while they initially expressed 
reservations about the modern press because it was thought to have threatened the sacred texts,176 
they started to embrace it once there arose the phenomenon of a “media mufti” who could use 
modern press to disseminate Islamic messaging.177 Their position seems to be that, while technology 
is a blessing, using it in religious matters should be done carefully to protect against the distorting of 
the message of Islam.178 As Daniel Crecelius puts it: “The transformation of Islamic society under the 
impact of the modernization has been the major concern of scholars interested in the modern history 
of Islam.”179 
In understanding the modern ulama’s responses to changes brought about by colonization and 
westernization, and the reasons for the strong opposition of the ulama to them, the Ottoman era 
“Tanzimat” reforms prove a particularly salient example. The Tanzimat represent a turning point in 
modern Muslim history when the Ottoman Empire adopted reforms that were broadly viewed as 
severely limiting the role of scholars. In reality, however, as the next section shows, the Tanzimat 
induced scholars to return to their original role and their traditional sphere—resorting to the people 
and operating in an independent and autonomous space.  
Between 1839 and 1876, the Sultans of the Ottoman Empire introduced a package of political, 
administrative, legal and social reforms known as the Tanzimat.180 In this section, I will discuss these 
reforms and their aftermath in the Muslim and Arab world, with a particular focus on Egypt, to 
show how these reforms affected scholars and their role.  
 
169 For example, ulama of Morocco supported local reforms but opposed the Protectorate. Only reforms that attempted to limit the 
influence of ulama in Morocco attracted the opposition of scholars. KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 106-7. 
170 HATINA, supra n. 9, at 134. 
171 HATINA, supra n. 9, at 83-6. 
172 HATINA, supra n. 9, at 106. 
173 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 288. 
174 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 116. 
175 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 288. 
176 HATINA, supra n. 9, at 33. 
177 See MESSICK BRINKLEY, Media muftis: Radio fatwas (in: Yemen, Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas, Harvard 
University Press 1996 ( David Powers and others eds.), at 310-20. See also, ZAMAN, supra n. 14, at 58. 
178 HATINA, supra n. 9, at 138. 
179 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 167. 
180 See CHAMBERS RICHARD, The Ottoman Ulema and the Tanzimat (in: Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in 
the Middle East Since 1500, University of California Press 1972), at 33-46. 
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2. The Tanzimat and its Aftermath 
After a long period during which the ulama enjoyed autonomy, the ulama were placed pursuant to 
the Tanzimat under the control of the Sultan when he introduced the office of chief mufti (Sheikh al-
Islam). Religious activities then came under the control of the state appointed mufti. Sultan Mahmud 
II (d. 1839) further made a distinction between the affairs of the state and the affairs of the ulama, a 
step that was followed by subordinating the affairs of the ulama to those of the state.181 The lesson of 
the Tanzimat is that these reforms jeopardized and actually infringed on scholars’ autonomy, and the 
autonomy of people they represented. It was not surprising to see scholars opposing not only the 
Tanzimat themselves, but other changes as well that resembled the Tanzimat throughout the Muslim 
world.182 
A notable response to the Tanzimat came from a conservative base of scholars. The stance of these 
ulama was depicted as a passive and indifferent response in that they saw these reforms as “worldly 
matters.”183 Again, as we saw from the analysis of “withdrawal,” this stand can also be seen as an 
active one, building social authority away from state affairs.  
The boldest moves of the Tanzimat involved the intervention of executive authorities in law making. 
Sultan Mahmud provided the concept of “adalat/justice” to be a resource of law along with Sharia 
and administrative ordinances, frequently referred to as Kanun (ordinances).184 A new council was 
formed so that the secular elites could make laws instead of Islamic jurists. In 1855, mixed courts 
were introduced. Within a few years (1840-1858), the Panel and then Land Codes were promulgated 
as well.185 
The culmination of these efforts was the creation of an Islamic Civil Code known as the Mejelle.  
Between 1869-76, a commission led by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha produced this massive 16-volume 
work, meant to be an Islamic equivalent of the Western Civil Code. The grand mufti firmly opposed 
this move, arguing that deciding Islamic law should be deferred to his office not a secular committee. 
Nonetheless, the official scholars did not oppose the Tanzimat in the hope that they could serve in 
the legal process.186 By the end of Tanzimat period, ulama did not actually lend legitimacy to the state 
but slowly and gradually stripped themselves, and perhaps the state, of legitimacy by subordinating 
religious institutions to the government. One commentator describes the attempts of reform during 
the Tanzimat to be “on the right track until the removal of effective law-making scholars to the 
advantage of the codes.”187 
The experience of Tanzimat inspired the “reformist” ruler in Egypt Muhammad Ali, and the year 
1872 marked the beginning of modernization for ulama and for al-Azhar. The impact of 
“modernization” in Egypt led to centralizing the government and threatening people’s values. 
Muhammad Ali did not challenge ulama in their religious institutions but, rather, he created another 
order that existed alongside and gradually changed the locus of focus and influence. It is not 
surprising that modernization for ulama meant a retreat not just from political influence but also from 
 
181 CHAMBERS, supra n. 180, at 35-7. 
182 CHAMBERS, supra n. 180, at 37. 
183 CHAMBERS, supra n. 180, at 41. 
184 CHAMBERS, supra n. 180, at 42. The “adalat” rule here resembles the English concept of “equity” with similar consequences. For 
the concept of equity in English and American law, see in general, HOHFELD WESLEY NEWCOMB, The Relations Between Equity 
and Law, Michigan Law Review (1913); NEWMAN RALPH ABRAHAM, Equity and Law: A Comparative Study, Oceana 
Publications. 1961. 
185 CHAMBERS, supra n. 180, at 42-4. 
186 CHAMBERS, supra n. 180, at 44. 
187 FELDMAN, supra n. 78, at 7. 
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social prominence. Although neglected during later period of Muhammad Ali’s rule, ulama still 
played an active role, however, through blocking some reformative projects. All major “reforms” 
proposed by Muhammad Ali were undermined by the absolute refusal of the ulama and students to 
support them. They even used space that was allowed by the reform to block further reforms.188 
Daniel Crecelius rightly notes that, although sheikhs and students truly desired reforms, each reform 
proposed was associated with government interference, and thus they were committed to opposing 
those proposed by Muhammad Ali.189 
To conclude, ulama could be guardians of change, but only to the extent that such change does not 
threaten their principles and public interests as they view them.  If they did see the change as 
threatening, as in the case of “Westernization,” they would not hesitate to fight it vigorously. 
VI. Conclusion  
In this article, I presented the different roles and modes of scholars to reemphasize the different 
forms of engagement that scholars can assume. These were all possible because they probably 
transcend the traditional rigid positioning of religious institutions in the modern state. Ulama appeal 
to people and form their positions according to what they think are the best interests of the public, as 
well as the tradition they carry and seek to protect. Most religious movements and productions are 
not directly traceable to formally organized institutions and even when such institutions happened 
to exist, their function was usually unrelated to the religious work, or to religious intellectual 
activities as a whole, or in any case less relevant than the broader sphere of jurists. This sphere was 
discussed in the context of the clergy in the Sunni and Hanbali experience, where hierarchy and 
institutionalization were rarely operative. The article ended with the debate of whether ulama, 
namely the Hanbalis, represented a “corporate group.” Different studies adopt different approaches 
to determine whether ulama and jurists have established the type of solidarity that would qualify 
them as a corporate group. However, I argue that, although many jurists were members of such 
corporate groups, not all of them were. The juristic sphere also encompassed many who were 
members neither of a corporate group nor even of a madhhab. This feature allowed jurists to protect 
their domain from both internal and external controls. 
 
188 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 183-204. 
189 KEDDIE, supra n. 2, at 204. 
